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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most interesting phenomena in post-World War II West-
ern Europe has been the utilization of guest workers mainly from coun-
tries in the Mediterranean Basin.' The influx of guest workers was
caused partly by the remarkable recovery of Western European econo-
mies after World War II due, in large measure, to economic programs
such as the massive United States Marshall Plan.2 As industrialization
in Europe expanded, shortages of workers developed.' The shortages
were especially acute for menial and manual jobs that nationals shunned
in favor of higher-paying jobs.4 In order to alleviate worker shortages,
foreign guest workers were allowed into Western European democracies
on a temporary basis, initially signing contracts for periods of time rang-
ing from one to two years.' Eventually, many of these workers decided
to stay in the countries in which they worked.6
As long as the economies of Western European countries were thriv-
ing, guest workers were not considered a problem and were tolerated.
The situation first changed drastically with the oil crisis of the early
I Reimann & Reimann, Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR MIGRATION
IN EUROPE 64 (R. Krane ed. 1979)[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LABOR]. Major groups of immi-
grants came from such countries as Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. In all,
at least 15 million workers and their dependents have been involved in the post-World War II migra-
tory worker movement. Id.
2 See generally C. NEE, THE MARSHALL PLAN: THE LAUNCHING OF THE PAX AMERICANA
(1984).
3 M. MILLER, FOREIGN WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE: AN EMERGING POLITICAL FORCE
7-10 (1981). Up to this time, foreign labor was not necessary since Western European labor needs
were satisfied by the massive influx of expellees and refugees from the Eastern Zone. Id.
4 P. GuPTE, THE CROWDED EARTH: PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS OF POPULATION 228-29
(1984). Guest workers were actively recruited to build roads and houses, work in hotels and restau-
rants, work in automobile and electronics factories, and keep the streets clean. Id.
5 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 16-17. According to Miller: "[a]fter the first year, foreign work-
ers qualify for permits that confer progressively greater employment and residency rights." Id. Af-
ter eight years most guest workers can qualify as permanent resident aliens; citizenship is far more
difficult to achieve. Id.; see infra note 42. See also J. BERGER, A SEVENTH MAN: MIGRANT WORK-
ERS IN EUROPE (1975)(a moving account of the life of a guest worker from his decision to leave
home in search of work to his decision to return).
6 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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1970s. Guest workers then became convenient scapegoats for unem-
ployed nationals who, in turn, pressured their governments to send guest
workers home.' Similar problems have reappeared in recent years as the
economies of Western European countries have suffered serious
8recessions.
The Federal Republic of Germany (the "FRG") has recently offered
cash payments to guest workers and their families as incentives to leave
the country.9 Immigrant organizations argue that the "payment-to-leave
plan," which expired in mid-1984, was the first phase in the implementa-
tion of a forced repatriation program.' ° How the FRG handles the guest
worker issue will set the pattern for the rest of Western Europe, since the
German situation is a microcosm of a European-wide problem." Ac-
cordingly, this Comment will specifically concentrate on the FRG.
Yugoslavs are the second largest contingent of foreign workers in
Europe and come from a country that is in the midst of economic, social,
and political upheaval. The guest worker issue also has similar conse-
quences in the FRG. This Comment, then, will emphasize the large Yu-
goslav labor force in the FRG.
First, this Comment will trace the history of the German use of
guest workers, summarize the economic, political, and social situations
of the FRG and Yugoslavia, and evaluate the current status of Yugoslav
guest workers in the FRG. Next, the Comment will argue that forced
repatriation could have a disastrous effect on the economies of both the
FRG and Yugoslavia-that a forced repatriation program is a short-
sighted temporary solution having long-term consequences. Finally, the
Comment will conclude that a return of guest workers could intensify
political and social unrest in Yugoslavia.
II. GUEST WORKERS IN THE FRG
A. Historical Use
Germany has a long tradition of employing foreign workers. The
7 P. GUPTE, supra note 4, at 227-28.
8 Europe's Immigration Battles, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 31, 1986, at 25-27; see also
Immigration: Fear of Foreigners, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1985, at 44 (fear of foreigners is stirring
in Western Europe and becoming a powerful issue).
9 Id. at 238. The FRG labor minister estimated that more than 85,000 of the approximately
300,000 unemployed foreigners would have qualified for the cash payment program. If all qualified
persons had taken advantage of the program, it would have cost the FRG about $110 million. The
resulting savings in unemployment pay and welfare benefits would have been about $50 million. The
program failed. Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 228.
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practice started in the nineteenth century in response to worker shortages
caused by rapid industialization requiring a large labor pool. 12 Tempo-
rary migrants from agricultural areas of adjacent countries supplied the
needed labor.13 By the early 1900s, up to one million foreign workers
had moved into Germany. 4 In addition, thousands of other workers
came to Germany to do seasonal work. 5 This massive influx of foreign-
ers spurred a growing xenophobia in Germany.16 This irrational fear of
Uberfremdung (over-foreignization) culminated in Hitler's reign of
terror.
17
Following World War II, two major factors encouraged migration
into the FRG: 1) the reduced size of the country; and 2) the division of
the country into different political zones.1 8 Both zones were confronted
with relocating inhabitants of former provinces into their reduced terri-
tory. 9 Nearly twelve million Germans who lived in the territories lost
after World War II and in other parts of Eastern Europe arrived in the
three Western zones of Germany that became the FRG. ° Subsequently,
between 1950 and 1972, more than 800,000 evacuees of German extrac-
tion from Poland and the Soviet Union also arrived.2 1 At the same time,
more than 100,000 non-German refugees decided not to return to their
native countries, but chose to remain in the FRG. 2
The second critical factor of postwar migration into the FRG was
political in nature. When the Soviets began installing a communist re-
gime in the German Democratic Republic (the "GDR"), many Germans
voted with their feet and crossed over into the FRG. Before the GDR
and the Soviet Union erected the Berlin Wall in 1961, more than three
million people had already left Eastern Europe. 3
Although most of these migrants were employable single males, the
employment situation was still unstable in the first decade after World
War II due to a war-weakened economy and a damaged infrastructure.24
12 See generally Reimann & Reimann, supra note 1. Acute needs for unskilled industrial work-
ers were initially filled by German agricultural workers. This, in turn, emptied the agricultural labor
market. Id.
13 Id. Most of the workers came from Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 65.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 63.
19 Id.
20 Id. The three Western zones were controlled by the United States, Great Britain, and France.
21 Id.
22 Id. Most of the refugees stayed because of the communization of Eastern Europe.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 63-64.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:181(1987)
By the early 1950s, the situation began to change as trade and industry
recovered. Both critically needed foreign financial support from the
Marshall Plan and the recovery of other Western European economies
led to this turnaround." By 1955, it was clear that the labor force in the
FRG was insufficient to keep pace with broad economic growth. The
FRG decided to permit the entry of foreign workers into the country and
signed bilateral treaties with a number of countries to facilitate recruit-
ment.26 As it had turned to foreign workers during the rapid industriali-
zation of the early 1900s, the FRG once again turned to foreign workers
to supply needed labor.2 7 It must be emphasized that, while the official
German administrative terms for migrant workers are Ausldndische
Arbeitnehmers (foreign employees or workers) and Ausldndische Arbeit-
skrafte (foreign manpower), the popular label for foreign workers is Gas-
tarbeiters (guest workers or temporary workers). This phraseology more
precisely depicts the uncertain status of the foreign worker in German
society.2 8
The guest worker population more than tripled from 686,000 in
1961 to 2,318,000 in 1968 as the FRG experienced unprecedented
growth.29 In 1961, 66% of the foreign population was employed; by
1968 only 57% of the foreign population was employed. The growing
number of foreign dependents in the FRG was partly the result of a gov-
ernment policy which allowed guest workers who had spent a year in the
FRO to bring in spouses and children under eighteen years of age.30 By
1974, guest workers represented 10% of the FRG's work force. 31 The
postwar labor migration peaked in 1974, at which time the FRG had a
foreign population of more than four million, representing about 7% of
the total population.32
The early-1970s was critical for the guest worker system in the
FRG. The energy crisis of 1973 and the economic recession that fol-
lowed provoked a government freeze on the further recruitment of for-
25 Id. at 64.
26 Id. at 66. The FRG signed bilateral treaties with Italy in 1955, Greece and Spain in 1960,
Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968.
27 See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
28 Id. at 65-66. The widespread use of the unofficial label Gastarbeiter reflects the indecisive
policy of the FRG. The term implies the attempt of the German population to assume a new atti-
tude toward foreigners who are vital to the economy of the FRG while still emphasizing the idea of a
temporary stay for guest workers. Id. at 66.
29 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 10.
30 Id.





eign workers."3 Although this halt in recruitment significantly decreased
the number of employed foreigners, the foreign population stabilized
rather than decreased. 4 The population loss resulting from unemployed
foreigners returning to their home countries was offset by two major phe-
nomena: 1) a relatively high birthrate among foreigners; and 2) the arri-
val of dependents not affected by the recruitment bans. 5 The number of
guest workers employed in the FRG dropped from 2.4 million in 1974 to
1.9 million in 1977 while the total foreign population dropped only
slightly-from 4.1 to 3.9 million.36 Relatively few workers were pres-
sured to return home, and the vast majority of workers who did return
home after 1973 left voluntarily.3
7
B. Guest Workers in the 1980s
The onset of another serious economic recession in the 1980s has
presented a more serious problem. Unlike the recovery in the United
States, recovery in Europe has been a slower process. For this reason,
guest workers once again have become a major political issue. Long-
standing tensions fueled by economic hardships made guest workers a
natural target. After Helmut Kohl became Chancellor of the FRG in
1982, the government formed a commission to investigate the guest
worker dilemma.38 The commission proposed a number of objectives
and recommendations: 1) to integrate foreigners into West German soci-
ety; 2) to limit the number of foreigners allowed to settle in the FRG; 3)
to provide economic incentives for guest workers and their families to
return to their homelands; 4) to impose stricter controls on the influx of
guest workers' families; and 5) to discourage extremist foreigner groups
who espouse radical politics. 39 The FRG instituted these recommenda-
tions in 1983. At the same time, the government set standards for per-
manent residence but did not set standards for citizenship. Guest
workers must: 1) have legitimate jobs; 2) be fluent in German; 3) secure
proper housing for their families; 4) secure proper educational facilities
33 Id. Though the economic situation was given as the official reason for implementing the
freeze, sociopolitical tensions also contributed to the decision.
34 Id. at 10-11. Throughout Western Europe, more than two million jobs were lost. Id. at 11.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 12.
37 Id. at 11.
38 P. GuPT, supra note 4, at 230. Chancellor Kohl's goal was a humane immigration policy.
The commission consisted of officials from agencies most directly involved with guest workers as
well as representatives from each of the 10 federal states. Id.
39 Id. at 230-31. The commission's report was submitted in early 1983. The first three objectives
had been initially proposed by Chancellor Kohl. The fourth and fifth objectives are stricter regula-
tions recommended by the commission itself. Id.
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for their children; and 5) not be fugitives from the law in their native
countries.4
Guest workers are guaranteed the same pay, vacation, fringe bene-
fits, bonuses, and protection against unlawful dismissal as other workers
in the FRG.4 Their status at work and chance of promotion, however,
are lower than that of their German counterparts. This is due, in part, to
unprotected rights as to residence and work, inadequate education, cul-
tural differences, and especially lack of fluency in German.42 Guest
workers are left to make the best of a difficult situation. Incentives to
guest workers and their families to leave the country were in force until
the summer of 1984. The government offered the equivalent of $3,600 to
each adult as well as $500 per child for the family to leave the country
and not return.4 3 Some companies also offered four months' pay plus
one-third of a month's pay for each year of service to departing guest
workers.' Although some workers returned to their homelands, the
program did not prove successful.
III. THE FRG TODAY: AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS
The FRG is still in the midst of an economic slowdown. The unem-
ployment rate has started to decline but still stands at approximately
9%-or more than two million unemployed.4 5 For guest workers, the
situation is more critical. Guest worker jobs tend to be concentrated in
recession-sensitive fields, such as construction and automobile manufac-
turing. Estimates show that more than 500,000 of the approximately 1.8
million guest workers are unemployed, which converts to an unemploy-
ment rate of approximately 27% of the guest worker population.4 6 Even
though guest workers have been hurt more than average German work-
ers, guest workers are still targets for unemployed Germans and radical
right-wing political parties. Many Germans are disturbed by competing
4o Id. at 231. See also Reimann & Reimann, supra note 1, at 68. Attaining citizenship is a very
difficult proposition. A minimum residence of 10 years is required and other prerequisites must be
fulfilled such as language competency and knowledge of the history and laws of the FRG. Even
then, the final decision is at the discretion of government administrators who must decide if the grant
of citizenship is in the best interests of the FRG. Id
41 Reimann & Reimann, supra note 1, at 78.
42 Id. Guest workers enjoy equal rights with respect to social benefits. They do not, however,
have any voting rights and cannot hold public office unless they are citizens. Sweden is the only
Western European country to allow guest workers to vote in local and regional elections. Id.
43 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1982, at A9, col. 6.
44 Id.
45 Survey West Germany, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1986, at 1.
46 Id. at 29.
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against foreigners for jobs, welfare benefits, and public housing.47 Jobs
that German nationals shunned as menial in the past are suddenly more
desirable in the face of troubled economic times. Anti-guest worker sen-
timent was echoed in the 1983 election theme: "Send them back home
and give their jobs to unemployed Germans."4 Chancellor Kohl and his
ruling coalition continue to advocate the commission's conclusions and
recommendations as the correct policy although opposition parties' views
differ.49 Some opposition parties propose a more liberal approach to the
issue, while more radical parties insist that the ultimate objective should
be to return guest workers to their native lands.5 ° At the present time,
the controversy still rages as the rest of Western Europe looks to the
FRG and the stand it will eventually take.
IV. YUGOSLAVIA TODAY: AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS
To understand fully the implications of any decision by the FRG
concerning guest workers, it is essential to examine the issue from the
Yugoslav perspective. The Yugoslav economy is reeling from a foreign
debt of $19 billion, an unemployment rate of 15%, and an inflation rate
of 100%.51 In the past few years, food shortages and rationing have be-
come a permanent factor in daily life. 2 The average Yugoslav citizen
spends approximately 65% of personal income on food. Yugoslavia's
self-management economy, praised in the past by some economists, has
evolved into what has been labeled a "self-mismanagement" economy.5 4
The current economic difficulties, however, are the worst since the
early 1950s, when the government of Josep Broz Tito was almost top-
pled. Massive influxes of foreign aid allowed that government to weather
the storm. 5 Yet the present day situation is also critical. The serious
47 p. GUPTE, supra note 4, at 227-28.
48 Id. at 229. A foreign affairs analyst has labeled guest workers as "guests who did not go
home." He added, "Germans are beginning to say that these people have overstayed their welcome.
It's a dismaying situation and potentially explosive indeed." Id.
49 Id. at 231-33.
50 Id.
51 Russell, Other Heresies, TIME, Jan. 6, 1986, at 63. See also No, Prime Minister, THE ECONO-
MIST, Mar. 31, 1987, at 81 (70% of Yugoslavia's total hard currency debt is owed to EEC countries
as was 87% of its $1.5 billion 1986 trade deficit).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See, e-g., Djilas, Yugoslavia's Crisis, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1983, at A23, col. 1. Djilas is the
last surviving architect of "Yugocommunism." Djilas's appraisal of Yugoslavia today advocates the
evolution of the Yugoslav system into a democracy.
55 S. PAWLOWITCH, YUGOSLAVIA 223-24 (1971). From 1950 to 1959, foreign aid, mostly from
the United States, totalled between $2 and $2.5 billion.
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economic problems have caused unrest in a nation that already has se-
vere problems controlling nationalist feelings in its republics and autono-
mous provinces.56 Yugoslavia's economic difficulties have forced the
government to implement severe austerity measures in order to qualify
for much-needed international loans. Such austerity measures tend to
produce social unrest, 57 which is further complicated by ethnic and re-
gional political problems in Yugoslavia."8 In addition, important eco-
nomic decisions are made at the local level by the six republics and the
two autonomous provinces that comprise Yugoslavia. This system,
which combines authoritarianism and decentralization, seems incapable
of solving the economic problems that fuel political and social unrest.5 9
Yugoslavia has two options: to democratize or to become more re-
pressive.6" Yugoslavia appears to have opted for the latter. The use of
added repression is calculated to ensure that economic difficulties do not
provoke labor and consumer unrest which could lead to demands for
basic social and political reforms. Nevertheless, labor and consumer un-
rest has become a problem in recent months.6
V. THE YUGOSLAV GUEST WORKER
Decisions affecting guest workers should reflect not only the con-
cerns of the FRG and Yugoslavia, but also the interests of the Yugoslav
guest worker population. Of the estimated 1.8 million guest workers in
the FRG, more than 340,000 are Yugoslav.62 The widespread use of the
label Gastarbeiter63 illustrates the German attempt to recognize the con-
tribution of these foreigners to the economy, while also emphasizing the
idea of a temporary stay."4 This idea reflects the mind set that the labor
shortages are short-term. Time, however, has shown that the shortages
56 See, e.g., Djilas, supra note 54, at A23; The Stirrings of Yugopluralism, THE ECONOMIST, Feb.
21, 1987, at 81.
57 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, YUGOSLAVIA PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE 11-17 (1985) [herein-
after REPORT ON YUGOSLAVIA].
58 Id. at 5.
59 Id. at 1-7.
60 Djilas, supra note 54, at A23.
61 No, Prime Minister, supra note 51, at 81. For additional discussion of the problem of repres-
sion, see Yuenger, Would-be Yugoslav 'Voice'is Told: Be Still, Chicago Trib., Apr. 7, 1987, at 1, col.
3.
62 PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN GERMANY 8 (1983). The Yugoslav population of
over 340,000 is second only to the Turkish population of more than 580,000. The next two major
groups are Italians and Greeks with populations of over 290,000 and approximately 124,000, respec-
tively. Counting other European countries, more than 500,000 Yugoslav workers are abroad. Id.





Many Germans argue that guest workers should not be permitted to
remain long enough to fulfill the requirements for naturalization; that is,
guest workers should not overstay their welcome. 6 One commentator
labels this belief that guest workers could and would want to return
home after brief trips abroad as the "myth of return." 67 Statistics show
just the opposite-that a sense of permanency is the norm among guest
workers. By 1976, more than 800,000 guest workers had lived in the
FRG for at least ten years and more than 1.1 million had lived in the
FRG for at least seven years. 8 The "myth of return" rests on a mis-
guided assumption that guest workers could be forced to leave en masse
or that they would repatriate of their own volition.69 Very few guest
workers have been forced to leave the FRG involuntarily, while many
more than originally anticipated are staying on as long-term residents.70
The longer they stay, the better their chances of political involvement in
FRG politics. 7
The Yugoslav guest workers' history in the FRG began in the early
1950s with a spontaneous and primarily illegal entry in search of employ-
ment and higher wages.7" The emigration took on significant propor-
tions in the early 1960s.71 By 1964, the Yugoslav government had
accepted the practice of labor emigration as a reaction to internal socio-
economic conditions.74 In 1969, Yugoslavia signed a bilateral employ-
ment agreement with the FRG regulating employment and ensuring the
rights of Yugoslav workers in the FRG.75 As a result of the bilateral
agreement, the number of Yugoslav workers in the FRG stood at more
than 400,000 by 1970.76 This figure dropped by 1982 to 367,000.77 In
65 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 9.
66 Id.
67 Id. By 1970 the "myth of return" began to dissipate as guest workers populations became
more permanent. Such a recognition required a rethinking of governmental policies towards guest
workers. See also, W. BOHNING, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 127 (1984).
68 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 12. Similar figures are present in the other Western European
democracies.
69 Id. at 2, 6.
70 Id. at 6-7.
71 Id. at 7. Guest workers are emerging as a political force that will have a significant influence
on the domestic and foreign politics of both the host and sending countries in the future.
72 I. BAUCIC, THE EtFacTs OF EMIGRATION FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF RE-
TURNING EMIGRANT WORKERS 2 (1972).
73 Id. The number of guest workers rose form about 8,800 in 1961 to more than 23,000 in 1962.
74 Id.
75 Id. More than two-thirds'of Yugoslav guest workers are employed in the FRG. The rest are
employed in Austria, France, Sweden, and Switzerland.
76 Id. See also Tanic, Yugoslavia in INTERNATIONAL LABOR, supra note 1, at 174. By the mid-
1970s some 650,000 Yugoslavs were guest workers. With dependents, this figure was close to 1
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the past few years, the population has remained relatively stable.78
Male Yugoslav guest workers are concentrated in two major job cat-
egories representing 75% of all employees: metal production and con-
struction. Female guest workers are employed in the sectors of private
services, electrical goods, public services, and textiles.79 Unlike earlier
Yugoslav guest workers who were employed in agricultural jobs, many
present Yugoslav guest workers hold skilled jobs.8" Statistics show that
54% of guest workers are in skilled and supervisory positions, 34% are
in semiskilled positions, and only 12% are in unskilled positions.81 Such
a distribution results in a higher socioeconomic status for Yugoslav guest
workers.
This exodus of skilled labor from Yugoslavia in the late 1960s and
early 1970s may be explained in part by lower wages in Yugoslavia.82
The average monthly wage for a worker in Yugoslavia at that time was
approximately $80 per month compared to $255 per month in the
FRG.83 The present economic crisis in Yugoslavia has intensified this
disparity. The average monthly salary in the FRG for a male industrial
employee had risen to $785 by 1983, while in Yugoslavia the average had
risen to only $150.84 Factors such as high inflation and economic
shortages in Yugoslavia greatly magnify the difference. More than 80%
of guest workers surveyed viewed migration as the means to make more
money, get out of poverty, or improve their future."
At the same time, the Yugoslav government has taken measures to
million. A total of 1.5 million Yugoslavs were outside of the country, representing 7% of the total
population. The following were abroad:
9% of the total male population,
12% of the male active population,
18% of the male active population aged 24-34,
11% of the active agricultural population,
14% of the active male agricultural population,
24% of the active male agricultural population aged 24-34,
12% of industrial workers, and
14% of industrial workers aged 24-34.
Id.
77 S. CASTLES, HERE FOR GOOD: WESTERN EUROPE'S NEW ETHNIC MINORITIES 75-77
(1984).
78 Id.
79 S. CASTLES & G. KOSACK, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN WESTERN
EUROPE 70-73 (1985).
80 Id. at 71.
81 S. CASTLES, supra note 77, at 134.
82 1. BAUCIC, supra note 72, at 6. See also Reimann & Reimann, supra note 1, at 78. A general
survey of guest workers across ethnic groups in FRG showed that 50% saw migration as a means to
earn more money.
83 Id. at 8.
84 PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 62, at 43.
85 Reimann & Reimann, supra note 1, at 78.
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help preserve ties with guest workers. Based on bilateral agreements,
Yugoslavia sends large quantities of newspapers, books, films, textbooks,
and radio and television programs to Yugoslav clubs and organizations
in the FRG.86 A major goal is to preserve national identity and social
homogeneity among the Yugoslav guest workers. A coronary purpose,
however, is the attempt to lessen the influence of revolutionary organiza-
tions operating in the Yugoslav worker communities abroad. 7
With the communist takeover of Yugoslavia in 1945, the battle for
many of the revolutionary organizations has become dual-faceted: to
overthrow the communist government and to gain independence for a
particular state or province. It has been estimated that more than 50,000
Yugoslavs are involved in radical organizations in the FRG.88 These or-
ganizations actively recruit Yugoslav workers. The support that these
counterrevolutionary organizations have received is a major source of
concern for the Yugoslav government and is considered a serious secur-
ity threat.89 In addition, other Eastern European regimes have expressed
concern over the development of anticommunism among Yugoslav
workers in the FRG.90 Yugoslavia's security forces have attempted to
weaken the influence of these opponents through a series of measures
ranging from influencing public opinion to assassinating political
figures. 91
Such political complications seem to explain, in part, Yugoslav poli-
cies with regard to return migration-the ultimate objective of repatria-
tion programs. 92 Guest workers who return to Yugoslavia are faced not
only with prolonged unemployment but also with greatly increased diffi-
culties of rejoining a culture they left behind.93
Yugoslav guest workers are thus put in a difficult position because of
their temporary status in the FRG and because of the economic and
political difficulties in their homeland. Resolution and clarification of the
guest worker issue is extremely important. The balance of this Comment
discusses the impact that repatriation would have on both the FRG and
Yugoslavia.
86 Tanic, supra note 76, at 179.
87 M. MILLER, supra note 3, at 54-55.
88 Id. at 54.
89 Id. at 56.
90 Id.
91 REPORT ON YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 57, at 7-9. Critics, while not condoning terrorism, have
been quick to condemn drastic tactics when exercised to silence pure political criticism.
92 Tanic, supra note 76, at 185.
93 See generally CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, MI-
GRANT WORKERS, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/132 (1983)[hereinafter MIGRANT WORKERS].
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VI. A POLICY OF REPATRIATION
A. Introduction
One of the major criticisms of the FRG's cash payment incentive
plan94 was that it could have been an initial step in the implementation of
some form of forced repatriation. While the ruling Christian Democratic
Party in the FRG emphasized that no such plan of forced repatriation
was contemplated, smaller political parties advocated such a plan.
Ironically, a policy of some type of repatriation is neither feasible
nor desirable for either the FRG or Yugoslavia. From economic, polit-
ical, and social viewpoints, a worker return would disrupt both countries
and intensify economic and political difficulties. In fact, guest worker
populations are no longer transitory; they have stabilized because of the
desire of workers to spend a lifetime working in the FRG. The key word
''guest" is a misnomer which should be replaced by a permanent resident
status. Workers and their families in many instances have spent more
than a decade in the FRG and the younger generation that has reached
adulthood aspire to the same goals as do German youth.95
B. The Effect on the FRG
The high unemployment rates during the recession of the early
1980s made repatriation, at first glance, an effective means of getting un-
employed Germans back to work. Yet it should be emphasized that
many of the jobs that guest workers hold are those ordinarily shunned by
German workers. Manual and menial jobs seem more desirable in such
troubled economic times. As economic conditions brighten, however,
German workers will undoubtably attempt to recapture more desirable
jobs. The result will be a new worker shortage that will once again de-
mand the influx of foreign workers.
Many Germans believe that a policy of repatriation will have a dis-
astrous effect on the economy. A recent study conducted by the Center
for Political Education in Bonn shows that the FRG would be beset with
economic difficulties by the departure of guest workers from the labor
force.9 6 Statistics from the study estimate that 25% of the miners, 35%
of highly-skilled auto workers, and 14% of the doctors in the FRG are
foreigners.97 The study concludes that if all foreigners left the FRG, to-
94 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
95 P. GUPTE, supra note 4, at 234 (citing J. POWER, MIGRANT WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES (1979)).




tal chaos would result. Parts of the FRG would lose from 8% to 13% of
their population, railway traffic would be paralyzed, generation of elec-
tric power would be severely curtailed, auto plants could not keep their
assembly lines operating, and hotels and restaurants and public services
performed by the government would be ill-staffed.98 In short, the FRG
would have serious difficulties coping with the massive disruption of the
valuable services guest workers provide.
Another purpose of the study by the Center for Political Education
was to warn of the mounting prejudice against guest workers.99 Of criti-
cal concern in this regard is the decline in the German birth rate. The
annual number of births fell from one million in the mid-1960s to less
than 500,000 by the mid-1970s.10° By the early 1980s, this figure had
dropped even further to 300,000 births. 10 1 If this trend continues, de-
mographers predict that the ethnic German population of fifty-five mil-
lion could drop to about forty million by the year 2030.102 On the other
hand, the birth rate of foreigners continues to increase, with the number
of births to guest workers higher than those to ethnic Germans in some
areas. 10 3 To some Germans, this population trend is alarming.
The high guest worker birth rate and the uniting of guest worker
families in the FRG also affects the German school system. Within the
past decade, the number of foreign students has increased fivefold.1"4
German parents complain that the presence of non-German students has
substantially impaired the standard and quality of education. Critics
point out that 60% of non-German students fail to get diplomas and
contend that this results in a sense of bewilderment and bitterness among
non-German students.10 5 At the same time, a second generation of im-
98 Id. at 230.
99 Id. at 229. See also Francis, West Europe's Guest Workers: Living Conditions Have Improved,
but Discrimination Persists, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 25, 1985, at 9-10 (migrant workers,
although better off financially, still face discrimination); Echickson, Racism in Europe: Europe
Tightens up on Immigration, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 26, 1984, at 20-21 (FRG is experiencing
increasing tension over the status of immigrants).
100 P. GuvrE, supra note 4, at 231. See also Francis, As German Population Shrinks, Economic
Questions Multiply, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 25, 1985, at 11. The population of the FRG is
declining by approximately 0.3% per year. If this trend continues, the population may be reduced
from 60 million today to 38 million by the year 2035. Id.
101 p. GuPTE, supra note 4, at 231. In addition, fewer than 100 children are born for every 100
marraiges. The result is that more than two-thirds of all families have two or fewer children. The
number of marriages has declined from nearly 450,000 in 1970 to fewer than 300,000 in 1982.
102 Id. at 232.
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migrant children have entered the labor market. These children have
passed through the German school system and share rising expectations
with German youth. Consequently, Yugoslav youth prefer not to do the
type of work which attracted their parents. 106 This second generation is
thus in direct competition with German workers for more skilled jobs,
thereby contributing to further tension.
All these factors combine to create a difficult situation for guest
workers and their families in the FRG. The average German should rec-
ognize that the guest worker plays a critical role in ensuring a healthy
economy. Current economic conditions reflect many factors, only one of
which is the presence of guest workers. For this reason, steps must be
taken to assist guest workers in gaining permanent status, more political
influence, and a better adjustment to life in the FRG.
C. The Effect on Yugoslavia
For Yugoslavia, the possibility that the FRG may institute some
system of repatriation is a critical concern. The emigration of Yugoslav
workers was conceded as a necessary consequence of economic difficul-
ties which began in the 1950s and has resurfaced with a vengeance in the
1980s. The return of guest workers would be a double blow for the Yu-
goslav economy. First, Yugoslavia cannot absorb hundreds of thousands
of newly unemployed workers. Jobs are very scarce and the workers'
return could at least double the unemployment rate. 107 Second, repatria-
tion would result in an acute shortage of hard currency. Presently guest
workers either send salaries earned in the FRG back to Yugoslavia or
keep the earnings in Yugoslav banks. This money provides the central
government with much-needed foreign currency. Assuming that the
350,000 Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG make the average monthly
industrial salary, they earn $275 million per month or more than $3 bil-
lion per year. The loss of this money would severely hamper the ability
of the Yugoslav government to provide welfare benefits. Providing sever-
ance money to the workers would help postpone the problem, but only
for a short period of time. Prior experience indicates that the severance
pay will be used to build a home, buy a car, or buy agricultural machin-
ery, thus quickly depleting the reserves brought back into the country. 108
From an economic standpoint, the Yugoslav government finds it desira-
ble to maintain a large work force abroad which sends back much-needed
106 Id. at 234 (citing J. POWER, supra note 95).
107 Nearly one million persons are unemployed in Yugoslavia. A large influx of guest workers
could push this figure to more than 1.5 million.
108 1. BAUCIC, supra note 72, at 24-33. See also MIGRANT WORKERS, supra note 93, at 42.
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foreign currency. 10 9
Yugoslavia's economic difficulties contribute to its present political
difficulties. Nationalistic feelings are becoming increasingly difficult to
control. The return of hundreds of thousands of guest workers would
create even more problems for an authoritarian system that is attempting
to maintain power in the face of increasing pressures to democratize.
The possibile return of workers who have lived for years in Western de-
mocracies and have been exposed to the views of various antigovernment
forces threatens the present Yugoslav government. 110 Consequently, the
Yugoslav government is uneasy about the policy of repatriation of guest
workers.
VII. CONCLUSION
Repatriation is against the interests of both the FRG and Yugosla-
via. From an economic viewpoint, any major form of forced repatriation
will greatly affect the FRG economy which is becoming increasingly de-
pendent on guest workers. A loss of the valuable services that guest
workers provide may create a critical economic slowdown. At the same
time, those Germans who now seem willing to perform the manual and
menial labor that guest workers perform will opt for more desirable jobs
when the economy recovers. Such a development would again produce a
large labor shortage that may precipitate, once again, a guest worker
migration.
The situation in Yugoslavia is even more troubling. Economic
problems are far more critical and have important political and social
implications. Yugoslav guest workers play a dual role: they lessen the
unemployment problem in Yugoslavia to a certain extent and provide an
important source of much-needed foreign currency. Loss of guest
worker employment in the FRG would cripple the Yugoslav economy.
National economic and political concerns should not overshadow
the importance of the status of guest workers in the ERG. Many of these
workers have opted for permanent residence in the FRG. Many of their
children were either born in the FRG or have spent most of their forma-
tive years there. Children of guest workers consider themselves to be
more German than Yugoslav. Repatriation would pose difficult transi-
tions for guest workers and their families. Consequently, guest workers
have been put in a precarious situation. The FRG views guest workers as
109 p. GuPTE, supra note 4, at 237.
110 REPORT ON YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 57, at 31-32. In recent years guest workers have been
arrested upon their return to Yugoslavia for "participation in hostile activity" under Article 131 of
the Federal Criminal Code. Id.
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guests who have overstayed their welcome; Yugoslavia sees guest work-
ers as workers who should stay abroad. Repatriation is not the solution
for either country.
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